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Abstract 
Demographic change can be observed throughout Europe. A bulk of literature has focused on 
ways to mitigate the consequences of ageing by reforming existing institutions of the welfare 
state. Another way to alleviate the long-run consequences of an ageing population is to re-
verse the demographic development by increasing the fertility rate. This is the subject this 
paper is about. It offers a short review about existing approaches analysing the factors which 
influence individual’s decision to have children. Firstly, an outline of the potential effects of 
the increasing dependency ratio on the welfare state and economic growth is provided. Spe-
cial attention is paid to the development in Germany which is one of the countries most se-
verely affected by low fertility. Furthermore, different theoretical approaches are described 
which attempt to explain why couples choose to have fewer children today. Lastly empirical 
work is considered which shows how policy changes affect fertility and that those findings are 
not always in line with economic theory.  
 
Table of Contents 
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1 
2 Social Insurance Systems under Pressure .......................................................................... 2 
3 Fertility and Economic Growth.......................................................................................... 3 
4 Economic Theories of Fertility .......................................................................................... 5 
5 Empirical Evidence ............................................................................................................ 6 
6 Conclusion.......................................................................................................................... 7 




Many European countries are struggling to finance their welfare states. Contribution 
or tax financed insurance schemes presuppose that a sufficient fraction of the popula-
tion participates in these schemes. If this were not the case, expenditures for pen-
sions, health-care or nursing care would exceed revenues and the insurance provider, 
in many countries the government, would run into serious financial problems. In de-
veloped countries it is, however, not a secret that the ratio between the beneficiaries 
and the contributors is changing. In the European Union1 the old age dependency 
ratio2 is predicted to increase from 22.1 in 1995 to 51 in 2045 (Eurostat 2006). This 
implies that in 2045 two people of working age will have to finance the pension for 
one elderly. For the year 2020 it is diagnosed for Germany that together with Italy it 
will be the country with the lowest proportion of young people within the EU (Euro-
stat 2006). Figure 1 shows a slightly more favourable development of the depend-
ency ratio in France and the Nordic countries Sweden and Denmark.  
 
Figure 1: Change in the dependency ratio 
To mitigate deficits in the government budget politicians, for example, reform their 
health insurance by introducing co-payments or the pay-as-you-go system by sup-
                                                 
1 25 member states. 
2 The old age dependency ratio is the ratio between the total number of elderly persons of an age when 
they are generally economically inactive (aged 65 and over) and the number of persons of working age 
(from 15 to64) (definition Eurostat 2006). 
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plementing it through funded private insurance. In the following special attention 
will be given to the situation in Germany which is one of the countries most severely 
affected by the ageing problem. 
2 Social Insurance Systems under Pressure 
Even politicians have realised that Germany’s social insurance system in its present 
form is unsustainable since it highly relies on contributions from a shrinking working 
population. The mandatory pay-as-you-go financed pension system is already se-
verely affected (Honekamp 2007). Unfortunately, there is no easy way to decrease its 
size when it becomes unsustainable. A fundamental change towards a funded scheme 
would entail a double burden for at least one generation. It would not be justifiable to 
ask the working population to finance the pensions of the retired and additionally 
save for their own retirement. A pareto improvement by switching to a funded 
scheme is unlikely even if one considers a long transition period and the higher re-
turn in the capital market as compared to the return of the pay-as-you-go pension. A 
further discussion of the financial implications due to a transition to a funded scheme 
has among others been provided by Breyer (1989) and Fenge (1995).  
Reforming the welfare state to make it compatible with the changing age structure of 
the population is not an easy task for the government. People are reluctant to accept 
changes especially if they are accompanied by a cut back of welfare benefits. Many 
politicians are cautious when reforming the pension or health insurance system. They 
feel that they operate near the threshold at which citizens just accept changes without 
insurrection. As a result, it can not be expected of the German government that it will 
succeed with its reforms in the near future. Fighting the symptoms is indisputable an 
important task for governments but there are limitations to reforms. For that reason it 
might be advisable to concentrate on reversing the demographic development as an 
additional policy goal. 
There are two causes of an increasing dependency ratio which can directly be derived 
from the calculation of the old age dependency ratio. On the one hand, people’s life-
expectancy continuously increased; in 1960 German males on average reached an 
age of 66.9 and today they can expect to live 75.96 years (Statistisches Bundesamt 
2006, Indexmundi 2007a). Medical advancements, less demanding manual work and 
a healthier life make it possible to grow older. There is nothing wrong with this de-
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velopment and neither economists nor politicians should bother decreasing life-
expectancy again. On the other hand fertility rates declined throughout the whole of 
Europe. Nowadays, it does not even reach the replacement rate of 2.1 children per 
woman which is needed to keep the population constant. Figure 3 below shows that 
France, Denmark and Sweden which face a lower dependency ratio than Germany 
also have a considerably higher fertility rate which is 1.9, 1.8, 1.7 and 1.3 in Ger-
many respectively. Since the number of people of working age directly enters the 
calculation of the dependency ratio, it is obvious that a higher fertility rate will con-
stitute a lower dependency ratio in the long run. The key to decrease population age-
ing is the fertility rate.  
 
Figure 2: International comparison of fertility rates 20033 
3 Fertility and Economic Growth 
The fertility rate of the United States is higher than the one in the European Union 
(Figure 2). According to Sinn (2005) this holds the risk that Europe will never man-
age to catch up with the innovative power of the United States. He argues that scien-
tists of all disciplines attain their maximum performance at age 35 on average. As 
this age group is shrinking so also does the innovative power, the establishment of 
new business and hence dynamic growth. However, when identifying the long-run 
consequences of low fertility, researchers are discordant. While Romer (1986, 1990) 
                                                 
3 FaFo 2005. 
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supports the argumentation of Sinn, Dalgaard & Kreiner (2001) come to a different 
conclusion. Allowing for endogenous skill formation they find that it is not the quan-
tity of citizens but solely the skill level of the average citizen that matters for the 
long-run level of per capita income. Cutler et al. (1990) find some evidence in a cross 
national analysis that nations with slower labour force growth experience more rapid 
productivity growth. Meijdam and Verbon (1997) argue that a decreasing number of 
children require a lower capital stock in order to keep per capita production at its 
former level (capital-thickening effect). This could lead to higher consumption pos-
sibilities for young and old. On the other hand, ageing also implies that total output 
per worker has to be shared with a larger number of pensioners (Dependency-ratio 
effect). In the long run they detect that the latter effect dominates the former thus 
individual utility decreases as the population is ageing. 
The discussion above shows that the economic consequences of ageing are not al-
ways considered negative. Nevertheless, when analysing the effects on social secu-
rity programs it is not possible to come up with an example in which ageing does not 
cause problems. When Konrad Adenauer reformed the German pension system in 
1957 towards a pay-as-you-go system with pensions adjusted for productivity growth 
he assumed that people would always have children. This assumption, however, 
turned out to be fatal leading to a large financial deficit in the pension system today. 
Figure 3 below shows that already in 1970 Germany’s fertility rate decreased below 
the replacement rate of 2.1 which is needed to keep the population constant.  
 
Figure 3: Fertility rates4 in Germany 1960-20045 
                                                 
4 Definition Fertility rate: Sum of children to which a 15 years old woman would give birth to during her 
live if she would behave like all the observed women aged 15-49 during the year under report. 
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4 Economic Theories of Fertility 
In order to counteract a low fertility rate it is important to develop an understanding 
of the process behind the child-bearing decisions. The fertility rates in the area of the 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) 
kept track until 1975 then they diverged and approached each other again around the 
year 2000. The sudden increase of the fertility in the GDR has been devoted to policy 
changes of the then government, the decrease after unification on the other hand to 
the adjustment process. This incident has been outlined in a study by Lechner (1997). 
Nowadays the number of children is largely a matter of choice. In western countries 
couples decide to have children on the grounds of economic constraints and personal 
satisfaction which they derive from an own child. The question to be answered re-
mains why people today decide to have fewer children than a few decades ago. Since 
child bearing is a choice which parents make, fertility can be treated as an endoge-
nous variable and suggests itself of being analysed economically. The first economic 
models which attempted to provide an answer to this question date back to the late 
1950’s and early 1960’s. The first contributors to this theory were Leibenstein (1957) 
and Becker (1960) who developed a micro-economic model based on consumer de-
mand theory and endogenous fertility. Most economic models constitute a household 
utility maximisation problem.6 Individuals maximise their utility which depends on 
the cost and benefits of children. A declining fertility rate has been explained by in-
creasing costs and declining benefits of raising children. Folbre (1994) argues that 
children increasingly become a public good. She claims that by providing social in-
surance based on participation in paid employment without explicitly valuing time 
effort or money devoted to children, the state literally transfers resources from par-
ents to non-parents. Hence the benefits which families derive from their children are 
more on moral or cultural ground than economic rewards. Moreover the cost of chil-
dren increased with more women in paid employment not willing to sacrifice their 
lifestyle or career for a child.  
After the literature that discussed the demand for children, contributions dealing with 
the socially optimal fertility rate followed.7 They show that individual fertility deci-
                                                                                                                                          
5 DESTATIS 2006. 
6 e.g. Becker & Barrow 1988, Becker & Lewis 1973, Cigno 1991. 
7 to mention a few: Nerlove et al. (1985) Razin & Sadka (1995) Groezen et al. (2003), Cigno et al. (2004). 
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sions in the majority of cases do not lead to a social optimum. Authors argue that it is 
necessary to subsidise families to equalise the private and the social benefit of having 
children; otherwise the social benefits would exceed private benefits. A survey by the 
Allensbach Institut (2004) reveals that 47% of respondents feel that a child would be 
a financial burden. In fact couples with two children face a five percentage point and 
couples with three children a twenty-two percentage point higher risk of poverty than 
couples without children (Bundeszentrale 2004). Children entail positive externalities 
for society which are not fully internalised by parents. In fact, the task of government 
policy should be to correct for this externality to restore a social optimal family size.  
Germany has a huge catalogue consisting of 145 different measures to support fami-
lies which amount to 184 billion € (German Federal Ministry for family, elderly, 
women and youth 2006). With this amount of expenditures Germany spends more on 
families than the EU average. Even France spends less than Germany but experi-
ences with 1.84 children per women in 2006 a higher fertility rate than Germany with 
1.39 (Robert Bosch Stiftung 2006; Indexmundi 2007b). Economic theory suggests 
that a government subsidising families through child benefits or other allowances 
reduces the costs of having children and hence should observe an increase in its fer-
tility rate.  
5 Empirical Evidence 
Traditional neoclassical models of fertility have repeatedly been criticised for the 
assumption that individuals have full information on the costs and benefits of various 
alternatives and that having a child is the result of an economically rational decision 
(Gautier 2001). In recent years economists started to analyse the effects of policy 
changes on fertility empirically. Multivariate analyses on the effects of policies on 
fertility are still not very numerous. A first group of multivariate studies concentrates 
on country panel data. Using this kind of aggregate country data does not allow in-
vestigating possible timing effects of family benefits on various sub-groups of the 
population (Gauthier & Hatzius 1997). It therefore must be assumed that for example 
the utility of low skilled women and women with a university degree is equally af-
fected by an increase of child benefits. This assumption is likely to be faulty because 
women earning a high salary will not realize a huge utility gain from an increase of 
child benefits of say 100 Euros as compared to women with a low earning power. 
Other studies use individual panel data which often provide a large number of obser-
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vations. This makes it possible to address possible timing effects and to test whether 
family policy has a different effect on women with a differential occupational posi-
tion.  
Gauthier (2001) acknowledges that policy changes often led people to have children 
earlier in life but not to have more children. After the German reunification in 1990 
Lechner (1997) found evidence that East German couples reacted to the German in-
stitutions and family policy by postponing their family formation but not necessarily 
to have fewer children. On the basis of individual data taken from the German Socio 
Economic Panel, Hank & Kreyenfeld (2003) find no evidence that the availability of 
public child-care facilities has an influence on child-bearing decisions. For the UK 
Ermisch (1988) concludes that even a doubling of child allowances would only mod-
erately increase family size. Studies using aggregate data (eg. Blanchet and Ekert-
Jaffé 1994, Gautier & Hatzius 1997, Whittington 1990) find the effect of an increase 
in family allowances, especially cash benefits or personal tax exemptions, to be posi-
tive and significant. The coefficients are often very small, with an increase of aver-
age benefits by 25 per cent leading to an increase of 0.07 children per women (Gau-
tier & Hatzius 1997).  
6 Conclusion 
Europe’s society is changing; families become smaller and many couples decide not 
to have any children at all. The resulting high dependency ratio makes it impossible 
to sustain existing welfare states. In 2020 it is diagnosed for Germany that together 
with Italy it will be the country with the lowest proportion of young people within 
the EU (Eurostat 2006). This alarming forecast has been encountered by the German 
government through pension and health-care reforms. It remains to be awaited how 
far reforms can be implemented without causing resistance in the population. This 
paper has focused especially on Germany which is one of the countries suffering 
most from the change of the age structure of the population. The field of welfare re-
forms, however, has been left behind and instead the work dealt with reversing the 
demographic development.  
Not all European countries share the same fate with Germany that the dependency 
ratio will rise above 50% until 2050. France, Denmark and Sweden for example are 
with a fertility rate around 1.8 in a more favourable position than Germany with a 
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fertility rate of 1.3 children. These numbers enter the calculation of the dependency 
ratio and imply that France and the Nordic countries have a greater group of people 
between whom the costs of retirement and health-care can be shared. Nevertheless, 
no European country can keep pace with the United States which experiences a fertil-
ity rate of 2.1. According to Sinn (2005), this is not only a challenge for the welfare 
state but comprises also the risk that Europe’s innovative power will never catch up 
with America. 
Nowadays the decision to have children is largely a matter of choice, this led re-
searchers to model fertility in economic terms. Thus before analysing the effects of 
policy changes on fertility, it is necessary to know which aspects individuals take 
into account when deciding to have children. Decreasing the costs of children 
through for example financial incentives or the provision of public day care should 
according to economic theory have a positive effect on family size. Empirical evi-
dence only partly supports this theory because the coefficients on family benefits or 
public day-care are often very small or insignificant. The existing literature shows 
that the decision to have children is dependent on numerous factors; many of them 
cannot easily be accounted for in models. The importance of children for individual 
happiness seems to have changed throughout time and between countries. When de-
ciding on the appropriate family policy each individual country has to take into ac-
count the preferences of its inhabitants as well as the existing institutions and family 
support which should be evaluated in terms of their goals and effectiveness. For that 
reason Germany set up a competence centre for family related benefits composed of 
social, financial and economic experts to develop a concept for a new family policy. 
Family Minister Ursula von der Leyen announced that first results will be available 
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